Arbeitspapier
Uncertain product risk, information acquisition, and product liability
We describe how product liability interacts with regulatory product approval in influencing a firm's incentives to acquire information about product risk, using a very parsimonious model. The firm may have insufficient information acquisition incentives when it is not fully liable for the harm caused by its product. The firm may also have excessive information acquisition incentives under both full and limited liability. We highlight efficiency inducing liability rules.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 19-2017
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
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Innovation
Product Liability
Uncertainty
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Friehe, Tim
Schulte, Elisabeth
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
- (wo)
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Marburg
- (wann)
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2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Friehe, Tim
- Schulte, Elisabeth
- Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
Entstanden
- 2017