Arbeitspapier

Uncertain product risk, information acquisition, and product liability

We describe how product liability interacts with regulatory product approval in influencing a firm's incentives to acquire information about product risk, using a very parsimonious model. The firm may have insufficient information acquisition incentives when it is not fully liable for the harm caused by its product. The firm may also have excessive information acquisition incentives under both full and limited liability. We highlight efficiency inducing liability rules.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 19-2017

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Innovation
Product Liability
Uncertainty

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Friehe, Tim
Schulte, Elisabeth
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
(wo)
Marburg
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Friehe, Tim
  • Schulte, Elisabeth
  • Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics

Entstanden

  • 2017

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