Uncertain product risk, information acquisition, and product liability

Arbeitspapier

We describe how product liability interacts with regulatory product approval in influencing a firm's incentives to acquire information about product risk, using a very parsimonious model. The firm may have insufficient information acquisition incentives when it is not fully liable for the harm caused by its product. The firm may also have excessive information acquisition incentives under both full and limited liability. We highlight efficiency inducing liability rules.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 19-2017

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: Innovation ; Product Liability ; Uncertainty

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Friehe, Tim ; Schulte, Elisabeth
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
• (where): Marburg
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162665
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET