Arbeitspapier
Bi and Branching Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Models: a Generalized Sufficient Condition
Bi and branching networks are two classes of minimal networks often found in the literatures of two-way flow Strict Nash networks. Why so? In this paper, we answer this question by establishing a generalized condition that holds together many models in the literature, and then show that this condition is sufficient to guarantee their common result: every non-empty component of minimal SNN is either a branching or Bi network. This paper, therefore, contributes to the literature by providing a generalization of several existing works in the literature of two-way flow Strict Nash networks.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 012.2018
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Thema
-
Network Formation
Strict Nash Network
Two-way Flow Network
Branching Network
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Charoensook, Banchongsan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Charoensook, Banchongsan
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2018
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