Arbeitspapier
Bi and Branching Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Models: a Generalized Sufficient Condition
Bi and branching networks are two classes of minimal networks often found in the literatures of two-way flow Strict Nash networks. Why so? In this paper, we answer this question by establishing a generalized condition that holds together many models in the literature, and then show that this condition is sufficient to guarantee their common result: every non-empty component of minimal SNN is either a branching or Bi network. This paper, therefore, contributes to the literature by providing a generalization of several existing works in the literature of two-way flow Strict Nash networks.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 012.2018
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Subject
-
Network Formation
Strict Nash Network
Two-way Flow Network
Branching Network
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Charoensook, Banchongsan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
-
2018
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Charoensook, Banchongsan
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2018
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