Artikel

Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games

In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite-player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 16 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1055-1093 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Thema
Large games
pure strategy
Nash equilibrium
generic property

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Carmona, Guilherme
Podczeck, Konrad
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE3967
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Carmona, Guilherme
  • Podczeck, Konrad
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2021

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