Arbeitspapier
Lending to the Unbanked: Relational Contracting with Loan Sharks
We study roughly 11,000 loans from unlicensed moneylenders to over 1,000 borrowers in Singapore and provide basic information about this understudied market. Borrowers frequently expect to repay late. While lenders do rely on additional punishments to enforce loans, the primary cost of not repaying on time is compounding of a very high interest rate. We develop a very simple model of the relational contract between loan sharks and borrowers and use it to predict the effect of a crackdown on illegal moneylending. Consistent with our model, the crackdown raised the interest rate and lowered the size of loans.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13360
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
- Thema
-
illegal lending
enforcement
relational contract
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lang, Kevin
Leong, Kaiwen
Li, Huailu
Xu, Haibo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lang, Kevin
- Leong, Kaiwen
- Li, Huailu
- Xu, Haibo
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2020
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