Arbeitspapier

Corporate boards and bank loan contracting

We investigate the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance-pricing provisions) are more favorable, and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, audit committee structure, and other board characteristics influence bank loan prices. However, they do not consistently affect all nonprice loan terms except for audit committee independence. Our study provides strong evidence that banks tend to recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating information risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post, and they reward higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.

ISBN
978-952-462-799-3
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 14/2012

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Francis, Bill
Hasan, Iftekhar
Wu, Qiang
Koetter, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Francis, Bill
  • Hasan, Iftekhar
  • Wu, Qiang
  • Koetter, Michael
  • Bank of Finland

Entstanden

  • 2012

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