Arbeitspapier

Private information and lender discretion across time and institutions

We assess the extent to which discretion, unexplained variations in the terms of a loan contract, has varied across time and lending institutions and show that part of this discretion is due to private information that lenders have on their borrowers. We find that discretion is lower for secured loans and loans granted by a larger group of lenders, and is larger when the lenders are larger and more profitable. Over time, discretion is also lower around recessions although the private information content is higher. The results suggest that bank discretionary and private information acquisition behaviour may be important features of the credit cycle.

ISBN
978-952-323-241-9
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 17/2018

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ambrocio, Gene
Hasan, Iftekhar
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Finland
(where)
Helsinki
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ambrocio, Gene
  • Hasan, Iftekhar
  • Bank of Finland

Time of origin

  • 2018

Other Objects (12)