Arbeitspapier
Private information and lender discretion across time and institutions
We assess the extent to which discretion, unexplained variations in the terms of a loan contract, has varied across time and lending institutions and show that part of this discretion is due to private information that lenders have on their borrowers. We find that discretion is lower for secured loans and loans granted by a larger group of lenders, and is larger when the lenders are larger and more profitable. Over time, discretion is also lower around recessions although the private information content is higher. The results suggest that bank discretionary and private information acquisition behaviour may be important features of the credit cycle.
- ISBN
-
978-952-323-241-9
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 17/2018
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Ambrocio, Gene
Hasan, Iftekhar
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Bank of Finland
- (where)
-
Helsinki
- (when)
-
2018
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ambrocio, Gene
- Hasan, Iftekhar
- Bank of Finland
Time of origin
- 2018