Arbeitspapier

Tax Responses in Platform Industries

Two-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known result of tax incidence is that consumers of a more heavily taxed good pay a higher price and thus buy less of the good. The present paper shows that this result need not hold in a two-sided market. On the contrary, a higher ad valorem tax may lower end-user prices and spur sales. Thus, two-sided platform firms may not at all engage in tax shifting via price increases. We further show that a higher ad valorem tax may undermine a firm's incentive to differentiate its product from that of its competitors. Finally, we demonstrate that the effects of increasing specific taxes may be the opposite of those of increasing value added taxes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: EPRU Working Paper Series ; No. 2010-02

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
Marktstruktur
Unvollkommener Wettbewerb
Optimale Besteuerung
Betriebliche Preispolitik
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kind, Hans Jarle
Koethenbuerger, Marko
Schjelderup, Guttorm
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
(wo)
Copenhagen
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kind, Hans Jarle
  • Koethenbuerger, Marko
  • Schjelderup, Guttorm
  • University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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