Platform Ownership

Arbeitspapier

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: We develop a general theoretical framework of trade on a platform on which buyers and sellers interact. The platform may be owned by a single large, or many small independent or vertically integrated intermediaries. We provide a positive and normative analysis of the impact of platform ownership structure on platform size. The strength of network effects is important in the ranking of ownership structures by induced platform size and welfare. While vertical integration may be welfare-enhancing if network effects are weak, monopoly platform ownership is socially preferred if they are strong. These are also the ownership structures likely to emerge.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 16

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
• Subject: Two-Sided Markets ; Network Effects ; Intermediation ; Product Diversity

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Nocke, Volker ; Peitz, Martin ; Stahl, Konrad
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2004

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13532
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94110
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13532-4
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET