Cross-ownership among firms: Some determinants of the separation of ownership from control

Arbeitspapier

This paper demonstrates that the current literature on cross-ownership among firms underestimates the true degree of separation between cash flow rights and voting rights. We use accounting identities to define coefficients of control, such that any (direct or indirect) control of a firm may be identified using these coefficients. This procedure is sufficient to show that under cross-ownership the voting rights associated with ownership are typically underestimated. We demonstrate by example that control and ownership of dividend rights may be entirely separated, and that multiple equilibria may exist in economies with cross ownership.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 113

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
• Subject: cross-ownership ; ownership and control ; corporate governance ; Corporate Governance ; Eigentümerstruktur ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ritzberger, Klaus ; Shorish, Jamsheed
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
• (where): Vienna
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71221
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET