Arbeitspapier
The river pollution claims problem
We propose the river pollution claims problem to distribute a limited pollution budget among agents located along a river. A key distinction with the standard claims problem is that agents are ordered and they are given priority based on their location in this order instead of their identity. We propose two new axioms that are relevant in the context of river pollution and use these to characterize two priority rules. Our characterization results show that Consistency plays an important role since it makes sure that any asymmetric treatment will be transferred across problems.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2022-058/VIII
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Externalities
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
- Subject
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Claims Problem
River Pollution
Pollution Permits
Priority Rules
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Yang, Yuzhi
Ansink, Erik
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2022
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Yang, Yuzhi
- Ansink, Erik
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2022
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Composition Properties in the River Claims Problem
Dividing justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims
Transboundary Externalities and Property Rights: An International River Pollution Model
Geographical Economics and the Role of Pollution on Location
Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims
Computing Alternating Offers and Water Prices in Bilateral River Basin Management
International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems
Asymmetric Nash Solutions in the River Sharing Problem
Risk attitude and air pollution: Evidence from chess
Should Pollution Taxes Be Targeted At Income Redistribution?
Polluted River Problems and Games with a Permission Structure
The Credibility Problem in Unemployment Insurance Policy
Composition Properties in the River Claims Problem
Dividing justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims
Transboundary Externalities and Property Rights: An International River Pollution Model
Geographical Economics and the Role of Pollution on Location
Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims
Computing Alternating Offers and Water Prices in Bilateral River Basin Management
International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems
Asymmetric Nash Solutions in the River Sharing Problem
Risk attitude and air pollution: Evidence from chess
Should Pollution Taxes Be Targeted At Income Redistribution?
Polluted River Problems and Games with a Permission Structure