Computing Alternating Offers and Water Prices in Bilateral River Basin Management

Arbeitspapier

This contribution deals with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992, Theory and Decision 32) on the use of Game theory in water management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic solutions impose a computational burden. For the bilateral alternating-offers model, a single optimization program significantly reduces the computational burden. Furthermore, water prices and property rights result from exploiting the Second Welfare Theorem. Both issues are discussed and applied to a bilateral version of the theoretical river basin model in Ambec and Sprumont (2002). Directions for future research are provided.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-095/1

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General ; Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
• Thema: International River Management ; Negotiation Theory ; Game Theory ; Computations ; Non-transferable utility ; Property rights ; Walrasian equilibrium prices ; Applied General Equilibrium model

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Houba, Harold
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86319
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 11.06.2025, 11:23 MESZ