Arbeitspapier

Three papers on bargaining

We know that people strike bargains and that civilized life could not proceed otherwise. Bargaining models yield solutions comparable to the general equilibrium in a competitive economy with universal self-interested behaviour subject only to economy-wide rules. Such models can be based upon a shared sense of what is fair, a sequences of concessions or an imposed bargaining procedure. The assumptions in these models are so from bargaining as it is experienced and the requirements for equilibrium so stringent that, if anything, the models serve to reduce confidence that bargains will actually be struck. Confidence in the efficacy of bargaining is more appropriately based upon experience rather than upon bargaining theory. 1) Bargaining Unexplained, page 2. 2) Bargaining Assumptions in the Study of Politics, Law and War, page 27. 3) Bargaining and Voting, page 49.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1239

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Thema
bargaining
voting
fairness
equilibrium
Verhandlungstheorie
Politik
Krieg
Wahlverhalten
Gerechtigkeit
Allgemeines Gleichgewicht

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Usher, Dan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Usher, Dan
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2010

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