Public Goods Games and Psychological Utility: Theory and Evidence

Arbeitspapier

We consider a theoretical model of a public goods game that incorporates reciprocity, guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking, and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions. In order to test our predictions, we implement the ‘induced beliefs method’ and a within-subjects design, using the strategy method. We find that all our psychological variables contribute towards the explanation of contributions. Guilt-aversion is pervasive at the individual-level and the aggregate-level and it is relatively more important than surprise-seeking. Our between-subjects analysis confirms the results of the within-subjects design.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7014

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Public Goods
• Subject: public goods games ; psychological game theory ; reciprocity ; surprise-seeking/guilt-aversion ; attribution of intentions ; induced beliefs method ; within and between subjects designs

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dhami, Sanjit ; Wei, Mengxing ; al-Nowaihi, Ali
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/180276
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET