Arbeitspapier
Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory
The mathematical framework of psychological game theory is useful for describing many forms of motivation where preferences depend directly on own or others' beliefs. It allows for incorporating, e.g., emotions, reciprocity, image concerns, and self-esteem in economic analysis. We explain how and why, discussing basic theory, experiments, applied work, and methodology.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8285
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
- Subject
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psychological game theory
belief-dependent motivation
reciprocity
emotions
image concerns
self-esteem
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Battigalli, Pierpaolo
Dufwenberg, Martin
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2020
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo
- Dufwenberg, Martin
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2020
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