Arbeitspapier

Dynamic Efficiency of Product Market Competition

We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D. Under Cournot competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand competition. More importantly, Cournot competition yields lower prices than Bertrand competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot competition exceeds that under Bertrand competition is even larger as competition over quantities always yields the largest producers' surplus.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 07-097/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
Bertrand competition
Cournot competition
process R&D
efficiency
Wettbewerb
Duopol
Technischer Fortschritt
Spillover-Effekt
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hinloopen, Jeroen
Vandekerckhove, Jan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hinloopen, Jeroen
  • Vandekerckhove, Jan
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2007

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