Arbeitspapier
Dynamic Efficiency of Product Market Competition
We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D. Under Cournot competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand competition. More importantly, Cournot competition yields lower prices than Bertrand competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot competition exceeds that under Bertrand competition is even larger as competition over quantities always yields the largest producers' surplus.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 07-097/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
-
Bertrand competition
Cournot competition
process R&D
efficiency
Wettbewerb
Duopol
Technischer Fortschritt
Spillover-Effekt
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hinloopen, Jeroen
Vandekerckhove, Jan
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hinloopen, Jeroen
- Vandekerckhove, Jan
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2007