Arbeitspapier
Competition for a Prize
I present a model in which individuals compete for a prize by choosing to apply or not. Abilities are private information and in attempt to select the best candidate, the committee compares applicants with an imperfect technology. The choice of application cost, size of the prize and use of information technology are being characterized. In equilibrium, the number of applicants is stochastic and may overload the committee. I show that in spite of overload, the optimal cost (size of the prize) is decreasing (increasing) in market size. Furthermore I show when having a perfect information technology is not optimal.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-013/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
asymmetric information
beauty contest design
award competition
information overload
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
van der Noll, Rob
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van der Noll, Rob
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2006
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Competition Policy for High Technology Industries
Price Competition on Graphs
Does Competition make Banks more Risk-seeking?
Selective Competition
Mobile Phones and Mozambique Farmers: Less Asymmetric Information and More Trader Competition?
Banking Competition and Soft Budget Constraints: How Market Power can threaten Discipline in Lending
The Impact of Losing in a Competition on the Willingness to seek Further Challenges
Bertrand Competition under Uncertainty
Price Competition on Graphs
Competition and Entry in Banking: Implications for Stability and Capital Regulation
Two Firms is enough for Competition, but Three or More is better
Asymmetric Price Effects of Competition
Competition Policy for High Technology Industries
Price Competition on Graphs
Does Competition make Banks more Risk-seeking?
Selective Competition
Mobile Phones and Mozambique Farmers: Less Asymmetric Information and More Trader Competition?
Banking Competition and Soft Budget Constraints: How Market Power can threaten Discipline in Lending
The Impact of Losing in a Competition on the Willingness to seek Further Challenges
Bertrand Competition under Uncertainty
Price Competition on Graphs
Competition and Entry in Banking: Implications for Stability and Capital Regulation
Two Firms is enough for Competition, but Three or More is better
Asymmetric Price Effects of Competition
Competition Policy for High Technology Industries
Price Competition on Graphs
Does Competition make Banks more Risk-seeking?
Selective Competition
Mobile Phones and Mozambique Farmers: Less Asymmetric Information and More Trader Competition?
Banking Competition and Soft Budget Constraints: How Market Power can threaten Discipline in Lending
The Impact of Losing in a Competition on the Willingness to seek Further Challenges
Bertrand Competition under Uncertainty
Price Competition on Graphs
Competition and Entry in Banking: Implications for Stability and Capital Regulation
Two Firms is enough for Competition, but Three or More is better