Arbeitspapier
Cheap talk and secret intentions in a public goods experiment
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2007,048
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
Public goods game
Cheap talk communication
Real-time protocol
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Öffentliches Gut
Information
Kommunikation
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Weiland, Torsten
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Levati, Maria Vittoria
- Weiland, Torsten
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2007
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
The provision of public goods with positive group interdependencies
Provision of multilevel public goods through positive externalities: Experimental evidence
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
How ultimatum offers emerge: A study in bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
The provision of public goods with positive group interdependencies
Provision of multilevel public goods through positive externalities: Experimental evidence
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
How ultimatum offers emerge: A study in bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
The provision of public goods with positive group interdependencies
Provision of multilevel public goods through positive externalities: Experimental evidence
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
How ultimatum offers emerge: A study in bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment