Arbeitspapier

Cheap talk and secret intentions in a public goods experiment

In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2007,048

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
Public goods game
Cheap talk communication
Real-time protocol
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Öffentliches Gut
Information
Kommunikation
Test

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Weiland, Torsten
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(where)
Jena
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Güth, Werner
  • Levati, Maria Vittoria
  • Weiland, Torsten
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2007

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