Arbeitspapier
Cheap talk and secret intentions in a public goods experiment
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2007,048
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Subject
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Public goods game
Cheap talk communication
Real-time protocol
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Öffentliches Gut
Information
Kommunikation
Test
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Weiland, Torsten
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (where)
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Jena
- (when)
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2007
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Güth, Werner
- Levati, Maria Vittoria
- Weiland, Torsten
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Time of origin
- 2007