Arbeitspapier
Rankings games
Research rankings based on publications and citations today dominate governance of academia. Yet they have unintended side effects on individual scholars and academic institutions and can be counterproductive. They induce a substitution of the taste for science by a taste for publication. We suggest as alternatives careful selection and socialization of scholars, supplemented by periodic self-evaluations and awards. Neither should rankings be a basis for the distributions of funds within universities. Rather, qualified individual scholars should be supported by basic funds to be able to engage in new and unconventional research topics and methods.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 39
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
General Economics: General
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Organization of Production
Personnel Economics: General
- Thema
-
academic governance
rankings
motivation
selection
socialization
Ranking-Verfahren
Kritik
Leistungsmotivation
Sozialisation
Hochschulforschung
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Frey, Bruno S.
Osterloh, Margit
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2011
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-51543
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Frey, Bruno S.
- Osterloh, Margit
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2011
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