Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-Game Between Terrorists and the Media

Arbeitspapier

It has often been pointed out in the literature that a symbiotic relationship exists between terrorist groups and the media. As yet, however, no formal model has been built based on this issue and only very little empirical research has been done in this field. The present contribution builds a simple game theoretic model, focussing on the social interactions between terrorists and the media. The model has features of a common-interest-game and results in multiple equilibria. After a discussion of the policy implications of the model, an empirical analysis is performed. Using newspaper coverage, terror incidents and terror fatalities data, it is shown that media attention and terrorism do mutually Granger cause each other, as predicted by the model. Moreover, it is explained why terror attacks tend to be ?bloodier? in developing countries than in Europe and the United States.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2006-08

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; National Government Expenditures and Education ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Time Allocation and Labor Supply
• Subject: Terrorism ; media ; common-interest-game ; coordination ; conflict

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Frey, Bruno S. ; Rohner, Dominic
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214354
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET