Arbeitspapier

Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-Game Between Terrorists and the Media

It has often been pointed out in the literature that a symbiotic relationship exists between terrorist groups and the media. As yet, however, no formal model has been built based on this issue and only very little empirical research has been done in this field. The present contribution builds a simple game theoretic model, focussing on the social interactions between terrorists and the media. The model has features of a common-interest-game and results in multiple equilibria. After a discussion of the policy implications of the model, an empirical analysis is performed. Using newspaper coverage, terror incidents and terror fatalities data, it is shown that media attention and terrorism do mutually Granger cause each other, as predicted by the model. Moreover, it is explained why terror attacks tend to be ?bloodier? in developing countries than in Europe and the United States.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2006-08

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
National Government Expenditures and Education
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Subject
Terrorism
media
common-interest-game
coordination
conflict

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Frey, Bruno S.
Rohner, Dominic
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
(where)
Basel
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Frey, Bruno S.
  • Rohner, Dominic
  • Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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