Arbeitspapier
Rankings games
Research rankings based on publications and citations today dominate governance of academia. Yet they have unintended side effects on individual scholars and academic institutions and can be counterproductive. They induce a substitution of the taste for science by a taste for publication. We suggest as alternatives careful selection and socialization of scholars, supplemented by periodic self-evaluations and awards. Neither should rankings be a basis for the distributions of funds within universities. Rather, qualified individual scholars should be supported by basic funds to be able to engage in new and unconventional research topics and methods.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 39
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
General Economics: General
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Organization of Production
Personnel Economics: General
- Subject
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academic governance
rankings
motivation
selection
socialization
Ranking-Verfahren
Kritik
Leistungsmotivation
Sozialisation
Hochschulforschung
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Frey, Bruno S.
Osterloh, Margit
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Zurich
- (when)
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2011
- DOI
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doi:10.5167/uzh-51543
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Frey, Bruno S.
- Osterloh, Margit
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2011