Arbeitspapier

Rankings games

Research rankings based on publications and citations today dominate governance of academia. Yet they have unintended side effects on individual scholars and academic institutions and can be counterproductive. They induce a substitution of the taste for science by a taste for publication. We suggest as alternatives careful selection and socialization of scholars, supplemented by periodic self-evaluations and awards. Neither should rankings be a basis for the distributions of funds within universities. Rather, qualified individual scholars should be supported by basic funds to be able to engage in new and unconventional research topics and methods.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 39

Classification
Wirtschaft
General Economics: General
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Organization of Production
Personnel Economics: General
Subject
academic governance
rankings
motivation
selection
socialization
Ranking-Verfahren
Kritik
Leistungsmotivation
Sozialisation
Hochschulforschung

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Frey, Bruno S.
Osterloh, Margit
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(where)
Zurich
(when)
2011

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-51543
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Frey, Bruno S.
  • Osterloh, Margit
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2011

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