Arbeitspapier

Static stability in games. Part 1: Symmetric and population games

Static stability in strategic games differs from dynamic stability in only considering the players' incentives to change their strategies. It does not rely on any assumptions about the players' reactions to these incentives and it is thus independent of the law of motion (e.g., whether players move simultaneously or sequentially). This paper presents a general notion of static stability in symmetric N-player games and population games, of which evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and continuously stable strategy (CSS) are essentially special cases. Unlike them, the proposed stability concept does not depend on the existence of special structures in the game such as multilinear payoff functions or unidimensional strategy spaces

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2017-07

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Thema
Static stability
evolutionarily stable strategy
continuously stable strategy
risk dominance
potential games

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Milchtaich, Igal
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Ramat-Gan
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Milchtaich, Igal
  • Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2017

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