Arbeitspapier
Effects of Hostility Tradition in Antitrust: Leniency Programs and Cooperation Agreements
The article focuses on the effects that type I errors can have on the incentives of firms to compete, collude or engage in efficiency promoting socially beneficial cooperation. Our results confirm that in the presence of type I errors the introduction of a leniency program can have ambiguous effects, including the destruction and prevention of welfare enhancing horizontal cooperation agreements. The obtained results help understand the negative impact the hostility tradition resulting in type I enforcement errors can have on social welfare when applied to the regulation of horizontal agreements.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Higher School of Economics Research Paper ; No. WP BRP 58/EC/2014
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Antitrust Law
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Thema
-
antitrust
competition
collusion
cooperation agreements
leniency
errors
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Pavlova, Natalia
Shastitko, Andrey
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
National Research University Higher School of Economics
- (wo)
-
Moscow
- (wann)
-
2014-04-17
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Pavlova, Natalia
- Shastitko, Andrey
- National Research University Higher School of Economics
Entstanden
- 2014-04-17
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