Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust cooperation between agencies. When international antitrust prosecution is uncoordinated, multi-market contact allows firms to reduce the amount of self-reporting in equilibrium and sustain cartels more effectively. We then discuss the effects of information sharing among antitrust authorities as a function of how much and which type of information is exchanged. We show that extensive information sharing might have an adverse effect on self-reporting by cartel members.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3005

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
• Thema: cartel formation ; multi-market contact ; leniency programs ; international antitrust cooperation ; Konzentrationspolitik ; Internationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordination ; Informationsaustausch ; Kartell ; Straffreiheit ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Gleichgewicht ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Choi, Jay Pil ; Gerlach, Heiko A.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39020
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ