Effects of Hostility Tradition in Antitrust: Leniency Programs and Cooperation Agreements

Arbeitspapier

The article focuses on the effects that type I errors can have on the incentives of firms to compete, collude or engage in efficiency promoting socially beneficial cooperation. Our results confirm that in the presence of type I errors the introduction of a leniency program can have ambiguous effects, including the destruction and prevention of welfare enhancing horizontal cooperation agreements. The obtained results help understand the negative impact the hostility tradition resulting in type I enforcement errors can have on social welfare when applied to the regulation of horizontal agreements.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Higher School of Economics Research Paper ; No. WP BRP 58/EC/2014

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Antitrust Law ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Subject: antitrust ; competition ; collusion ; cooperation agreements ; leniency ; errors

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Pavlova, Natalia ; Shastitko, Andrey
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): National Research University Higher School of Economics
• (where): Moscow
• (when): 2014-04-17

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122051
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET