- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
2041-1723
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
Dispositional free riders do not free ride on punishment ; volume:9 ; number:1 ; day:19 ; month:6 ; year:2018 ; pages:1-9 ; date:12.2018
Nature Communications ; 9, Heft 1 (19.6.2018), 1-9, 12.2018
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Urheber
-
Weber, Till O.
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- DOI
-
10.1038/s41467-018-04775-8
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2018082123034840897912
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Weber, Till O.
- Weisel, Ori
- Gächter, Simon
- SpringerLink (Online service)
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Free Ride
Free riders play fair
BLOW RideR #1
Can endogenously chosen institutions mitigate the free-rider problem and reduce perverse punishment?
Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games
Members, Joiners, Free-Riders, Supporters
Members, Joiners, Free-riders, Supporters
Rating agents: Scapegoat or free-riders?
Amalgamation, free-ride behavior, and regulation
Incentivizing a carbon-free economy: a method to identify free-riders
Distortionary taxation and the free-rider problem
To free ride or not to free ride? Role of patterning and feedback in the public goods game
Free Ride
Free riders play fair
BLOW RideR #1
Can endogenously chosen institutions mitigate the free-rider problem and reduce perverse punishment?
Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games
Members, Joiners, Free-Riders, Supporters
Members, Joiners, Free-riders, Supporters
Rating agents: Scapegoat or free-riders?
Amalgamation, free-ride behavior, and regulation
Incentivizing a carbon-free economy: a method to identify free-riders
Distortionary taxation and the free-rider problem
To free ride or not to free ride? Role of patterning and feedback in the public goods game
Free Ride
Free riders play fair
BLOW RideR #1
Can endogenously chosen institutions mitigate the free-rider problem and reduce perverse punishment?
Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games
Members, Joiners, Free-Riders, Supporters
Members, Joiners, Free-riders, Supporters
Rating agents: Scapegoat or free-riders?
Amalgamation, free-ride behavior, and regulation
Incentivizing a carbon-free economy: a method to identify free-riders
Distortionary taxation and the free-rider problem