Arbeitspapier
To free ride or not to free ride? Role of patterning and feedback in the public goods game
We study a public goods game where subjects get feedback either continually or intermittently. We find that the intermittent feedback helps to mitigate problems of free riding because subjects in this treatment focus more on a string of choices rather than deciding on a case by case basis as in the continuous feedback treatment.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Wellesley College Working Paper ; No. 2003-02
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Thema
-
Public Goods ; Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ; Patterned Feedback ; Free riding ; Expectations
Öffentliches Gut
Spieltheorie
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Chaudhuri, Ananish
Chen, DeeDee
Graziano, Sara
McIntire, Frances
Winkler, Dawn
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wellesley College, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Wellesley, MA
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Chaudhuri, Ananish
- Chen, DeeDee
- Graziano, Sara
- McIntire, Frances
- Winkler, Dawn
- Wellesley College, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2003