Rationing rules and stable coalition structures

Artikel

This paper introduces a model of coalition formation with claims. It assumes that agents have claims over the outputs they could produce by forming coalitions. Outputs, insufficient to meet the claims and are rationed by a rule whose proposals of division induce each agent to rank the coalitions in which she can participate. As a result, a hedonic game of coalition formation emerges. Using resource monotonicity and consistency, we characterize the continuous rationing rules that induce hedonic games that admit core-stability.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 933-950 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: Coalition formation ; hedonic games ; core-stability ; rationing rules

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gallo, Oihane ; Iñarra García, Elena
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2018

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE2870
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197167
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET