Artikel
Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
This paper introduces a model of coalition formation with claims. It assumes that agents have claims over the outputs they could produce by forming coalitions. Outputs, insufficient to meet the claims and are rationed by a rule whose proposals of division induce each agent to rank the coalitions in which she can participate. As a result, a hedonic game of coalition formation emerges. Using resource monotonicity and consistency, we characterize the continuous rationing rules that induce hedonic games that admit core-stability.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 933-950 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Thema
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Coalition formation
hedonic games
core-stability
rationing rules
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Gallo, Oihane
Iñarra García, Elena
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2018
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE2870
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Gallo, Oihane
- Iñarra García, Elena
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2018
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