Arbeitspapier
Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to extend past results to games that are not totally balanced (understood in this special setting) we introduce subgame-consistency that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while subgames that are never reached are ignored.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 83.2009
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Partition Function
Externalities
Implementation
Recursive Core
Stationary Perfect Equilibrium
Time Consistent Equilibrium
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kóczy, László Á.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kóczy, László Á.
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2009