Arbeitspapier

Deferred Compensation and Gift Exchange : An Experimental Investigation into Multi-Period Labor Markets

This paper examines the relationship between firms? wage offers and workers? supply of effort using a three-period experiment. In equilibrium, firms will offer deferred compensation: first period productivity is positive and wages are zero, while third period productivity is zero and wages are positive. The experiment produces strong evidence that deferred compensation increases worker effort; in about 70 percent of cases subjects supplied the optimal effort given the wage offer, and there was a strong effort response to future-period wages. We also find some evidence of gift exchange; worker players increased the effort levels in response to above equilibrium wage offers by a human, but not in response to similar offers by a computer. Finally, we find that firm players who are initially hesitant to defer compensation learn over time that it is beneficial to do so.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1193

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
Labor Contracts
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Thema
deferred compensation
pensions
experimental labor economics
personnel economics
gift exchange
incentives
shirking
Vergütungssystem
Betriebliche Altersversorgung
Betriebliche Sozialleistungen
Leistungsanreiz
Anreizvertrag
Spieltheorie
Experiment
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Wallace, Brian
Seltzer, Andrew J.
Huck, Steffen
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Wallace, Brian
  • Seltzer, Andrew J.
  • Huck, Steffen
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2004

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