Arbeitspapier

Capital Regulation and Tail Risk

The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context when banks may choose tail risk assets. We show that this undermines the traditional result that higher capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. When capital raising is costly, poorly capitalized banks may limit risk to avoid breaching the minimal capital ratio. A bank with higher capital has lesschance of breaching the ratio, so may actually take more risk. As a result, banks which have access to tail risk projects may take greater risk when highly capitalized.The results are consistent with stylized facts about pre-crisis bank behavior, and suggest implications for the optimal design of capital regulation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-039/2/DSF14

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
Thema
Bank Regulation
Risk Shifting
Capital Requirements
Tail Risk
Systemic Risk
Bankrisiko
Basler Akkord
Bankenliquidität
Bankenregulierung

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Perotti, Enrico
Ratnovski, Lev
Vlahu, Razvan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Perotti, Enrico
  • Ratnovski, Lev
  • Vlahu, Razvan
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2011

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