Information sharing in contests

Arbeitspapier

We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or R&D. We consider the cases where firms have (i) independent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated. With independent values, an industry-wide agreement to share information can arise in equilibrium. Expected effort is lower with than without information sharing. With common values, an industry-wide agreement to share information never arises in equilibrium. Expected effort is higher with than without information sharing.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 334

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: information sharing ; contest ; all-pay auction ; Wissenstransfer ; Wettbewerb ; Auktionstheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kovenock, Dan ; Morath, Florian ; Münster, Johannes
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2010

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13220
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94133
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13220-1
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET