Arbeitspapier

Firms and early retirement: Offers that one does not refuse

According to the Hutchens (1999) model, early retirement is not explained as a result of maximizing expected individual utility but rather as a demand-side phenomenon arising from a firm's profit-maximizing behaviour. Firms enter into contracts with their employees that include clauses about early retirement. In response to demand or technological shocks, workers receive retirement offers from their employers which cannot be rejected by rational actors. Using the IAB Establishment Panel 2003-2006, the relationship between indicators of demand and technological shocks and the incidence and amount of early retirement is analysed. The results provide general support to the Hutchens model.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2931

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Flexible Altersgrenze
Arbeitsvertrag
Implizite Kontrakte
Arbeitsnachfrage
Technischer Fortschritt
Schock
Deutschland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bellmann, Lutz
Janik, Florian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bellmann, Lutz
  • Janik, Florian
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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