Arbeitspapier
Objective versus Subjective Performance Evaluations
Why does incentive pay often depend on subjective rather than objective performance evaluations? After all, subjective evaluations entail a credibility issue. While the most plausible explanation for this practice is lack of adequate objective measures, I argue that subjective evaluations might sometimes also be used to withhold information from the worker. I furthermore argue that withholding information is particularly important under circumstances where the credibility issue is small. The statements are derived from a two-stage principal-agent model in which the stochastic relationship between effort and performance is unknown.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 430
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Economics of Contract: Theory
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
-
Performance evaluation
principal-agent
moral hazard
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Terstiege, Stefan
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
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München
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
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doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17335
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17335-1
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Terstiege, Stefan
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2013