Arbeitspapier

Objective versus Subjective Performance Evaluations

Why does incentive pay often depend on subjective rather than objective performance evaluations? After all, subjective evaluations entail a credibility issue. While the most plausible explanation for this practice is lack of adequate objective measures, I argue that subjective evaluations might sometimes also be used to withhold information from the worker. I furthermore argue that withholding information is particularly important under circumstances where the credibility issue is small. The statements are derived from a two-stage principal-agent model in which the stochastic relationship between effort and performance is unknown.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 430

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Economics of Contract: Theory
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Thema
Performance evaluation
principal-agent
moral hazard

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Terstiege, Stefan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2013

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17335
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17335-1
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Terstiege, Stefan
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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