Arbeitspapier
Subjective evaluations with performance feedback
This paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations: their incentive role and their feedback role. The paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction, as long as there exists some verifiable measure of performance. It also shows that while subjective pay is helpful, it cannot achieve full efficiency. However, fully efficient incentives are achievable if the firm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers. With a small number of workers, a forced distribution is valuable only if the verifiable measure is poor.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1283
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
-
Subjective Evaluations
Performance Feedback
Optimal Incentive Contracts
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Zabojnik, Jan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Kingston (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Zabojnik, Jan
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2011
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