Arbeitspapier

Financial crisis resolution

This paper studies a dynamic version of the Holmstrom-Tirole model of intermediated finance. I show that competitive equilibria are not constrained efficient when the economy experiences a financial crisis. A pecuniary externality entails that banks' desire to accumulate capital over time aggravates the scarcity of informed capital during the financial crisis. I show that a constrained social planner finds it beneficial to introduce a permanent wedge between the deposit rate and the economy's marginal rate of transformation. The wedge improves borrowers' access to finance during a financial crisis by strengthening banks' incentives to provide intermediation services. I propose a simple implementation of the constrained-efficient allocation that limits bank size.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2012-42

Classification
Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: Financial Markets
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General
Subject
Financial system regulation and policies
Financial markets

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schroth, Josef
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2012

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2012-42
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schroth, Josef
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2012

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