Arbeitspapier
Information, amplification and financial crisis
We propose a parsimonious model of information choice in a global coordination game of regime change that is used to analyze debt crises, bank runs or currency attacks. A change in the publicly available information alters the uncertainty about the behavior of other investors. Greater strategic uncertainty makes private information more valuable, so more investors acquire information. This change in the proportion of informed investors amplifies the impact of the initial change in public information on the probability of a crisis. Our amplification result explains how a small deterioration in public information can cause a financial crisis.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2014-30
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Financial Crises
- Thema
-
Financial institutions
Financial stability
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ahnert, Toni
Kakhbod, Ali
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bank of Canada
- (wo)
-
Ottawa
- (wann)
-
2014
- DOI
-
doi:10.34989/swp-2014-30
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ahnert, Toni
- Kakhbod, Ali
- Bank of Canada
Entstanden
- 2014