Arbeitspapier

On the politicization of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Germany after unification

A recent decision of the German Constitutional Court requires political decision makers to revise the system of intergovernmental transfers in order to limit free bargaining among state and federal government officials. The present paper provides empirical support for the thesis that political discretion has become increasingly important in the transfer negotiations after Unification. We attempt to show why political influences gained weight relative to economic considerations in the determination of net gains. This politicization of the fiscal transfer system appears to be a consequence of the inability of policy makers to agree on a fundamental reform in the early 1990's.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 0105

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Thema
Horizontaler Finanzausgleich
Verfassungsgericht
Deutschland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schneider, Friedrich
Pitlik, Hans
Strotmann, Harald
Schmid, Günther
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics
(wo)
Linz
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schneider, Friedrich
  • Pitlik, Hans
  • Strotmann, Harald
  • Schmid, Günther
  • Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2001

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