Arbeitspapier

Publicity and the Clustering of IPO Underpricing

We explain why underpricing in IPOs can be large in magnitude and clustered, using a signalling model where firms have private information about their qualities (high or low). A novel feature is that a firm, if perceived by the market as high quality, benefits from the industry's publicity which is an increasing function of the amount of IPO underpricing by all high-quality firms in the industry. Despite the potential free-rider problem created by the industry's publicity, we show that a high-quality firm chooses to underprice its own IPO as the best response to other high-quality firms' underpricing. Thus, IPO underpricing is clustered.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 990

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Initial public offering
Signalling
Externality
Multiple equilibria

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cao, Melanie
Shi, Shouyong
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
1999

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cao, Melanie
  • Shi, Shouyong
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1999

Ähnliche Objekte (12)