Arbeitspapier
Publicity and the Clustering of IPO Underpricing
We explain why underpricing in IPOs can be large in magnitude and clustered, using a signalling model where firms have private information about their qualities (high or low). A novel feature is that a firm, if perceived by the market as high quality, benefits from the industry's publicity which is an increasing function of the amount of IPO underpricing by all high-quality firms in the industry. Despite the potential free-rider problem created by the industry's publicity, we show that a high-quality firm chooses to underprice its own IPO as the best response to other high-quality firms' underpricing. Thus, IPO underpricing is clustered.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 990
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
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Initial public offering
Signalling
Externality
Multiple equilibria
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cao, Melanie
Shi, Shouyong
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
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Kingston (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cao, Melanie
- Shi, Shouyong
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 1999