Arbeitspapier

Characterization of pure strategy equilibria in uniform price IPO auctions

We characterize pure strategy equilibria of common value multi-unit uniform price auctions under the framework of initial public offerings, where bidders have incomplete private information regarding the value of shares and submit discrete demand schedules. We show that there exists a continuum of equilibria where investors with a higher expectation about the value of shares bid for higher quantities at higher prices, and as a result the market price increases with the market value. The collusive equilibria, in which investors place bids regardless of their expectation about the value, are obtained under stricter conditions than in the continuous price case.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2009-05

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
IPO, uniform price auction
divisible goods auction
share auction
tacit collusion
Wertpapieremission
Auktionstheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Capital Asset Pricing Model
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Zhang, Ping
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
(wo)
Nottingham
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Zhang, Ping
  • The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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