Artikel
A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: genericity, stability, and purification
This paper studies generic properties of Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification. To establish these results, we introduce a notion of regularity for dynamic stochastic games and exploit a simple connection between normal form and dynamic stochastic games.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 5 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 369-402 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- Thema
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Dynamic stochastic games
Markov perfect equilibrium
regularity
genericity
finiteness
strong stability
essentiality
purifiability
estimation
computation
repeated games
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Doraszelski, Ulrich
Escobar, Juan
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
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2010
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE632
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Doraszelski, Ulrich
- Escobar, Juan
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2010