Artikel

Time Preferences and Bargaining

This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining, allowing for arbitrarily history-dependent strategies. I derive a simple sufficient structure for optimal punishments and thereby fully characterize (i) the set of equilibrium outcomes for any given preference profile, and (ii) the set of preference profiles for which equilibrium is unique. Based on this characterization, I establish that a weak notion of present bias—implied, for example, by any hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting—is sufficient for equilibrium to be unique, stationary, and efficient. Conversely, I demonstrate how certain violations of present bias give rise to multiple (non-stationary) equilibria that feature delayed agreement under gradually increasing offers.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Econometrica ; ISSN: 1468-0262 ; Volume: 86 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 173-217 ; Oxford: Wiley

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
time preferences
dynamic inconsistency
alternating offers
bargaining
optimal punishments
delay

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wiley
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
(where)
Oxford
(when)
2018

DOI
doi:10.3982/ECTA14396
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
  • Wiley
  • ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Time of origin

  • 2018

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