Artikel

Time Preferences and Bargaining

This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining, allowing for arbitrarily history-dependent strategies. I derive a simple sufficient structure for optimal punishments and thereby fully characterize (i) the set of equilibrium outcomes for any given preference profile, and (ii) the set of preference profiles for which equilibrium is unique. Based on this characterization, I establish that a weak notion of present bias—implied, for example, by any hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting—is sufficient for equilibrium to be unique, stationary, and efficient. Conversely, I demonstrate how certain violations of present bias give rise to multiple (non-stationary) equilibria that feature delayed agreement under gradually increasing offers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Econometrica ; ISSN: 1468-0262 ; Volume: 86 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 173-217 ; Oxford: Wiley

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
time preferences
dynamic inconsistency
alternating offers
bargaining
optimal punishments
delay

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wiley
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
(wo)
Oxford
(wann)
2018

DOI
doi:10.3982/ECTA14396
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
  • Wiley
  • ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Entstanden

  • 2018

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