Repayment versus investment conditions and exclusivity in lending contracts

Arbeitspapier

Lenders condition future loans on some index of past performance. Typically, banks condition future loans on repayments of earlier obligations whilst international organizations (official lenders) condition future loans on the implementation of some policy action ('investment'). We build an agency model that accounts for these tendencies. The optimal conditionality contract depends on exclusivity - the likelihood that a borrower who has been denied funds from the original lenders can access funds from other lenders.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4604

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; International Lending and Debt Problems
• Subject: Long-term loans ; investment conditions ; repayment conditions ; exclusivity ; Kreditgeschäft ; Konditionen ; Kreditwürdigkeit ; Anpassungsprogramm des IWF ; Anreizvertrag ; Agency Theory ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bougheas, Spiros P. ; Dasgupta, Indraneel ; Morrissey, Oliver
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35878
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET