Arbeitspapier

Group versus Individual Lending in Microfinance

Microfinance is typically associated with joint liability of group members. However, a large part of microfinance institutions rather offers individual instead of group loans. We analyze the incentive mechanisms in both individual and group contracts. Moreover, we show that microfinance institutions offer group loans when the loan size is rather large, refinancing costs are high, and competition between microfinance institutions is low. Otherwise, individual loans are offered. Interestingly, our analysis predicts that individual lending in microfinance will gain in importance in the future if microfinance institutions continue to get better access to capital markets and if competition further rises.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2008-24

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
International Finance Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
Thema
Mikrofinanzierung
Kreditgeschäft
Genossenschaftsbank
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lehner, Maria
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
München
(wann)
2008

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.7486
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-7486-4
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lehner, Maria
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2008

Ähnliche Objekte (12)