Arbeitspapier
Group versus Individual Lending in Microfinance
Microfinance is typically associated with joint liability of group members. However, a large part of microfinance institutions rather offers individual instead of group loans. We analyze the incentive mechanisms in both individual and group contracts. Moreover, we show that microfinance institutions offer group loans when the loan size is rather large, refinancing costs are high, and competition between microfinance institutions is low. Otherwise, individual loans are offered. Interestingly, our analysis predicts that individual lending in microfinance will gain in importance in the future if microfinance institutions continue to get better access to capital markets and if competition further rises.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2008-24
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
International Finance Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
- Subject
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Mikrofinanzierung
Kreditgeschäft
Genossenschaftsbank
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lehner, Maria
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
- (where)
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München
- (when)
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2008
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.7486
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-7486-4
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lehner, Maria
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Time of origin
- 2008