Arbeitspapier
Repayment versus investment conditions and exclusivity in lending contracts
Lenders condition future loans on some index of past performance. Typically, banks condition future loans on repayments of earlier obligations whilst international organizations (official lenders) condition future loans on the implementation of some policy action ('investment'). We build an agency model that accounts for these tendencies. The optimal conditionality contract depends on exclusivity - the likelihood that a borrower who has been denied funds from the original lenders can access funds from other lenders.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4604
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
International Lending and Debt Problems
- Thema
-
Long-term loans
investment conditions
repayment conditions
exclusivity
Kreditgeschäft
Konditionen
Kreditwürdigkeit
Anpassungsprogramm des IWF
Anreizvertrag
Agency Theory
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bougheas, Spiros P.
Dasgupta, Indraneel
Morrissey, Oliver
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bougheas, Spiros P.
- Dasgupta, Indraneel
- Morrissey, Oliver
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2009
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