Arbeitspapier

Discrete investment and tax competition when firms shift profits

In this paper, we model the tax setting game between two revenue maximizing countries which compete for the location of a single production plant owned by a multinational firm. We introduce the possibility that the multinational can shift a fraction of its profits out of the country where the production plant is located. In this framework, it is investigated how a change in the costs of profit shifting affects equilibrium tax rates. We show that in most cases, equilibrium tax rates of the two countries will be higher under profit shifting than without. Unless profit shifting does not become too easy, the strategic adjustment of profit tax rates will typically harm the multinational firm.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: cege Discussion Papers ; No. 52

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Multinational Firms; International Business
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm
Thema
tax competition
profit shifting
multinational enterprises
discrete investment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Stöwhase, Sven
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
(wo)
Göttingen
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Stöwhase, Sven
  • University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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