Arbeitspapier

The Environmental Impact of Bertrand and Cournot Duopolies. A Cautionary Note

We compare a Bertrand with a Cournot duopoly in a setting where production is polluting and exploits natural resources, and firms bear convex production costs. We adopt Dastidar's (1995) approach, yielding a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing also, to show that softening price competition may lead to a lower output production in a Bertrand rather than a Cournot industry. The market structure bringing about the lowest output determines the highest social welfare, given the fact that the negative environmental effects of production more than offset the gain in consumer surplus.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 812

Classification
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economics of Regulation
Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
Environmental Economics: Government Policy

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2012

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4206
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Tampieri, Alessandro
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2012

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